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ABSTRACT 
 
Goal pursuit can involve deliberate and conscious processes, but can also occur automatically 
and nonconsciously, following the priming of specific contents.  The way in which priming and 
conscious goals combine remains unresolved.  We investigated the effect of goal-compatible or 
goal-incompatible priming on the pursuit of a conscious goal.  Participants 1) were primed with 
accuracy-related words or inaccuracy-related words, 2) were given an instruction of accuracy 
(i.e. a conscious goal), and 3) performed an unskilled motor task.  Results indicated that both 
nonconscious priming and conscious goal influence motor performance. Effects of priming and 
conscious goal pursuit are additive when contents are compatible and subtractive when they are 
incompatible.Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 12, No. 6)  (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée) 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Goal pursuit can involve deliberate and conscious processes but can also occur outside of 
awareness, intent and control (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, 
Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002).  Thus, goal pursuit can be influenced 
or triggered by a conscious act of will as well as external and nonconscious factors.  This paper 
aims to explore the interplay between nonconscious goal-compatible or goal-incompatible 
priming and a conscious (i.e., explicitly assigned) goal in the case of a motor performance task.  
 
Nonconscious Goal Activation and Pursuit 
 
Knowledge structures (e.g., schemas, stereotypes, traits) stored in memory can be activated 
automatically and significantly change behavior (see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001 for a review).  
Like other knowledge structures, goals can also be automatically activated (Bargh, 1990; 
Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler, 
2002).  Evidences indicate that priming words or concepts highly related to a specific goal can in 
turn nonconsciously activate this goal in memory (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996).  Thus, for 
instance, priming words such as "succeed, win, compete, etc." activates the goal of performing 
well (Bargh et al., 2001).  Once activated, either consciously or nonconsciously, goals operate 
effectively and "guide a person’s goal-relevant cognition, affect, and behavior from that point 
on" (Bargh et al., 2001; p. 1015).  A growing number of studies indicate that using goal priming 
and explicitly given instructions produce similar outcomes and influence a broad range of 
behaviors (e.g., judgment, Fitzsimons, & Bargh, 2003; anagram resolution, Shah & Kruglanski, 
2002; memory performance, Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; voice intensity, Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 
2003). However, an important issue remains unclear: how do nonconsciously activated contents 
and conscious goals interplay? Do they contribute additively or non-additively to performance? 
 
Competition Between Nonconscious Priming and Conscious Goals 
 
When people, at a given moment, encounter conscious conflicting goals, they generally solve the 
conflict by consciously and willingly arranging the goals according to a hierarchy (Emmons, 
King, & Sheldon, 1993).  They select a primary goal on the basis of motivational factors or of 
the characteristics of the goals. When a goal is subjectively important, specific in its definition or 
challenging, it leads to commitment, involvement and high performance (Locke & Latham, 
1990).  In sum, in the case of conscious goals conflict, the goal selection process relies on 
conscious and deliberate factors.  But, what happens when a conscious goal is conflicting with 
nonconsciously activated cognitions?  Few studies have explored experimentally the interplay 
between nonconscious priming and conscious goal pursuit. Moreover, these studies provide 
contradictory results. 
 
MacRae and Johnston (1998) observed that nonconscious priming effects disappeared when 
people have an intentional goal.  In their study, in the absence of a competitive conscious goal, 
participants primed with words related to helpfulness displayed more helping behavior (i.e., 
picked up items dropped by the experimenter) than non-primed participants.  However, when 
participants had a competing goal in mind (they were late for the next experimental session), Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 12, No. 6)  (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée) 
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priming effects disappeared.  So, priming effects were eliminated in presence of a competing 
conscious goal.   
 
Other results indicated that conscious goal pursuit does not systematically eliminate 
nonconscious goal pursuit or goal-related priming.  For instance, Bargh et al. (2001; Exp. 2) 
observed that participants were more cooperative when they had been previously primed with 
words related to “cooperation” either in presence or in absence of an assigned cooperation goal.  
Interestingly, when cooperation was activated both nonconsciously (through priming) and 
consciously (through assigned instructions), the result pattern was additive.   
 
Kruglanski et al. (2002) also explored the interplay between priming and conscious goal pursuit 
in the framework of their Theory of Goals Systems (Kruglanski et al., 2002).  More specifically, 
they observed that while a conscious goal is pursued, the accessibility of an alternative primed 
goal undermined persistence and performance in a task.  This effect was greater when the two 
goals were perceived as unrelated than possibly related.   
 
In Bargh et al. (2001) the interplay between nonconscious priming and conscious goals 
concerned primes and goals that were similar in terms of contents, that is highly compatible. 
Conversely, in MacRae and Johnston (1998), as well as in Shah and Kruglanski (2002), 
nonconsciously primed content and conscious goal’s content were not only incompatible but also 
clearly referred to different objectives.  It suggests that the interplay between nonconscious 
priming and conscious goals depends on the compatibility between the primed content and the 
conscious goal.  When the nonconsciously activated content is compatible with the conscious 
goal (Bargh et al., 2001), the priming effect seems to add to the effect of the conscious goal.  
Conversely, when the primed content is incompatible (MacRae & Johnston, 1998), the conscious 
goal seems to override or eliminate the influence of priming.   
 
Present Study 
 
How can nonconscious priming and conscious goal pursuit be combined as a function of their 
compatibility?  What happens when conscious goal and primed contents refer to the two 
extremes of a same continuum and are applicable to the same task?  Our study was an attempt to 
test the interplay between conscious goal pursuit and compatible or incompatible nonconscious 
priming in the case of an unskilled motor task.  We also aimed to explore the effects of a 
manipulation of the conscious goal’s characteristics on the outcome of this interplay.  Indeed, 
depending on its characteristics, a conscious goal is perceived as more or less important or 
salient and, consequently, is more or less efficiently pursued (Locke & Latham, 1990).  Thus, 
manipulating conscious goal’s characteristics, such as the level of specificity of the instructions, 
was a way of strengthening the conscious goal and, consequently, experimentally increasing or 
decreasing the compatibility or incompatibility between this goal and the previously primed 
content.   
 
We assumed that the outcome of the interplay between nonconscious priming and conscious goal 
pursuit depends on their compatibility.  Depending on whether compatibility between the 
conscious goal and the primed content is high or low, different patterns of means, strategies and 
response programs (corresponding to the nonconscious priming and to the conscious goal) Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 12, No. 6)  (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée) 
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should be activated.  Depending on the degree of matching, the pursuit of a conscious goal 
should be facilitated or impeded by a compatible or incompatible primed content.  When priming 
and goal are compatible, the pursuit of the conscious goal should be facilitated by the priming 
and the effects of priming and conscious goal should be added to each other (see Bargh et al., 
2001; Exp. 2).  When priming and goal are incompatible, two hypotheses compete.  The first 
assumes that incompatible priming and conscious goal cannot coexist.  In other words, conscious 
goal pursuit should eliminate priming effects (see MacRae & Johnston, 1998).  The second 
hypothesis assumes that primed content and conscious goals are processed in a relatively 
independent manner.  In this case, the effect of nonconscious priming should decrease (but not 
necessarily disappear) in the presence of an incompatible conscious goal.  So, we would expect 
to find main effects of priming and conscious goals, but not an interaction between the two.   
 
METHOD 
 
An Unskilled Motor Task: The Wire Game 
 
Principles and Characteristics 
 
The aim of the "wire game" is to move a ring along a wire avoiding contact between the ring and 
the wire.  This task requires a high level of motor control as well as good hand-eye coordination.  
The apparatus featured a wire, 115 cm long and 2.5 mm in diameter.  The ring was 1.2 cm in 
diameter.  The wire was twisted into a shape that provided a real challenge in terms of difficulty. 
 
Pre-Experiment 
 
We ran a pre-experiment to: 1) test the instructions concerning the manipulation of the 
specificity of the conscious accuracy goals and 2) test the task and provide a standard level of 
performance.  Thirty-three right-handed students participated in the pre-experiment.  They were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions.  In the first condition, they performed the task with 
a high level of focus on accuracy (high specificity).  In the second condition, participants applied 
an intermediate level of focus on accuracy (moderate specificity).  Finally, in the third condition, 
participants were only informed that they had to move the ring along the wire (low specificity).  
We measured the number of times the ring touched the wire and the time to complete the task.  
 
We performed a one-way ANOVA to assess the effect of the conscious accuracy goal specificity 
(high, moderate, low) on dependent measures.  The mean of the contact made between the ring 
and the wire was lower when the requested level of accuracy was high (M = 11.00) than when it 
was moderate (M = 14.54) or low (M = 24.18), F(2, 32) = 12.46, p < .001. The manipulated 
factor also yielded a main effect on the time spent performing the task, F(2, 32) = 6.68, p < .004.  
Participants spent more time when the specificity of the accuracy goal was high (M = 66.10 s) 
than when it was moderate (M = 52.09 s) or low (M = 32.10 s). 
 
Participants and Design 
 
The between subjects factorial design crossed 2 nonconscious priming (accuracy vs. inaccuracy) 
by 3 conscious accuracy goal specificity (high, moderate, low).  Sixty-six right-handed Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 12, No. 6)  (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée) 
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undergraduates (10 men, 56 women; mean age 20.6 years), unskilled in the task, participated in 
the experiment. Their participation was volunteered and they did not receive credits or money in 
return. Gender effects, found to be non significant, will not be discussed.   
 
Materials 
 
Nonconscious Priming 
 
We used a Scrambled Sentence Task as the priming manipulation (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 
1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979).  Participants were requested to produce a sentence using words 
presented in a scrambled order.  Two versions of the task were constructed.  The first one 
intended to prime "accuracy", the other to prime "inaccuracy".  In the priming conditions, 20 out 
of the 30 sentences contained a word or an expression related to accuracy (e.g., sharpshooter; 
detailed; thoroughness) or inaccuracy (e.g., clumsy; inaccurate; approximate).  The remaining 
sentences, used in both versions, were neutral (e.g., book; soup; pen). 
 
Conscious Goal Implementation 
 
We used three sets of instructions to implement a conscious accuracy goal in participants.  The 
instructions differed as a function of their level of specificity.  The high specificity condition 
maximized the accuracy goal by instructing the participants to focus intently on accuracy and 
make no errors.  Participants were told:  "Your task is to move the ring around and along the 
wire from point A to point B.  During the task really pay attention not to touch the wire."  
Instruction of the moderate specificity condition pushed the accuracy goal into the background 
by permitting some errors:  "Your task is to move the ring around and along the wire from point 
A to point B.  During the task, avoid touching the wire too much. "  Finally, the low specificity 
condition did not explicitly mention any accuracy goal:  "Your task is to move the ring around 
and along the wire from point A to point B. " 
 
Dependent Measures 
 
Dependent measures were the number of times contact was made between the ring and the wire 
(collected by a hidden electronic sensor) and the time spent completing the task (extracted from a 
video recording). 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were informed that they would be taking part in two out of three separate unrelated 
tasks: a language test, a logic test, and a motor-skill test.  After a fake random assignment, all 
participants were informed that they would first have to complete the language test (i.e., the 
Scrambled Sentence Task) and then to perform the motor-skill test.  Participants were then 
randomly handed one of the versions of the scrambled sentence task.  After the completion of the 
"language test", they were instructed to move to another desk where the wire game was held. 
Participants then read one of the three accuracy instructions and performed the task.  Finally, 
they were debriefed and thanked.  As a part of the debriefing the experimenter probed carefully 
for any suspicions regarding the relationship between the priming manipulation and the motor Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 12, No. 6)  (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée) 
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task.  More specifically, a funneled questionnaire (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) included questions 
concerning what the participants thought the experiment was about and whether they thought one 
part or task in the experiment might have affected another part or task.  No participant indicated 
any awareness or suspicion that the words used on the priming task were related to the 
subsequent task. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Performance 
 
The number of times contact occurred between the ring and the wire was analyzed by a 2 
nonconscious priming (accuracy vs. inaccuracy) x 3 conscious accuracy goal specificity (high, 
moderate, low) between subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA).  There was a significant main 
effect of the nonconscious priming, F(1, 60) = 18,78, < .001 (Eta square = .24).  Participants 
primed with accuracy produced less contact (M = 9.27) than participants primed with inaccuracy 
(M = 19.94).  The main effect of the conscious accuracy goal specificity, F(2, 60) = 5.28, 
p < .008 (Eta square = .15), revealed that the number of times contact occurred was greater when 
the conscious goal specificity was low (M = 19.57) than when it was moderate (M = 15.09) or 
high (M = 9.61).  The interaction was not significant, F(2, 60) = 0.04.  Thus, nonconscious 
priming and conscious goal manipulations produced an additive effect on performance.  
Whatever the specificity of the conscious goal was, planned comparisons indicated that 
differences between accuracy priming and inaccuracy priming conditions were significant 
(respectively, F(1, 60) = 6.72, p < .013 for high specificity, F(1,60) = 6.49; p < .014 for moderate 
specificity and F(1, 60) = 5.63, p < .03 for low specificity).  Comparing these results with the 
results obtained in a separate control condition in which we did not use accuracy related primes, 
it appeared that conscious goal pursuit tends to be facilitated by a goal-compatible priming and 
impeded by a goal-incompatible priming (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1:  Mean Number of Contacts Made Between the Ring and the Wire (and Standard 
Deviation) as a Function of Nonconscious Priming and Conscious Goal 
 
  Conscious Accuracy Goal Specificity 
Nonconscious Priming  Low   Moderate   High  
Accuracy   14.30 
(5.73) 
9.82 
(7.51) 
4.58 
(4.42) 
Inaccuracy   24.36 
(13.50) 
20.36 
(13.17) 
15.09 
(10.09) 
No Prime 
(Control Condition) 
24.18 
(5.38) 
14.54 
(7.60) 
11.00 
(6.03) 
 
Task Completion Time 
 
A 2 nonconscious priming (accuracy vs. inaccuracy) by 3 conscious accuracy goal specificity 
(high, moderate, low) ANOVA yielded a main effect of nonconscious priming on task 
performance time, F(1, 60) = 5.93, p = .018 (Eta square = .09).  Participants performed the task Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 12, No. 6)  (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée) 
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quicker when they were primed with inaccuracy (M = 54.35 s) than with accuracy (M = 68.18 s).  
There was a significant main effect of the conscious goal, F(2, 60) = 11.81, p < .001 (Eta 
square = .28). Task performance time was longer when the conscious accuracy goal specificity 
was high (M = 77.27) than when it was moderate (M = 59.72) or low (M = 45.36).  Planned 
comparisons indicated significant time differences between high and moderate specificity 
conditions, F(1, 60) = 7.33, p = .009, and between low specificity condition and the two former 
ones; respectively, F(1, 60) = 23.44, p < .001 and, F(1, 60) = 4.60; p < .03.  The interaction was 
not significant F(2, 60) = 0.84.  Comparing these results with those obtained in absence of 
priming (separate control condition), performance time tends to be increased by a goal-
compatible priming (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2:  Mean Time of the Motor Task Performance (and Standard Deviation) as a 
Function of Nonconscious Priming and Conscious Goals (in seconds) 
 
  Conscious Accuracy Goal Specificity 
Nonconscious Priming  Low   Moderate   High  
Accuracy   50.79 
(24.51) 
70.87 
(33.83) 
80.22 
(13.70) 
Inaccuracy   40.42 
(23.54) 
48.57 
(15.04) 
74.05 
(10.71) 
No Prime 
(Control Condition) 
32.10 
(25.91) 
52.09 
(18.28) 
66.10 
(17.83) 
 
Note that when the high accuracy goal faced the inaccuracy priming, the time required by 
participants to complete the task was relatively long (the second longest of all conditions).  This 
result could reflect an inhibition process caused by the high degree of contents’ incompatibility.  
This attempt to inhibit nonconscious incompatible content would result in a higher cognitive 
load, leading participants to longer time to completion as well as to more mistakes.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We investigated the influence of compatibility between nonconscious priming and explicit 
instruction (i.e. conscious goal) on the performance on an unskilled motor task.  The main 
objective was to disentangle results obtained in the case of priming and conscious goal pursuit.  
Indeed, whereas some results indicated that nonconscious priming effects are eliminated when a 
conscious goal is available, other results imply that both nonconscious priming and conscious 
goals influence behavior.  We assumed that the compatibility between the primed content and the 
conscious goal was a key factor in the understanding of the interplay between nonconscious 
priming and conscious goal pursuit.  
 
Results indicated that nonconscious goal-related priming influences performance in an unusual 
and unskilled motor task, shaping consciously goal directed behaviors even when the primes are 
incompatible with the assigned instructions.  Interestingly, incompatible primes produced an 
effect even if conditions to maximize efficiency of conscious goal pursuit (high specificity and 
challenge) were satisfied.  Concerning the interplay between priming and conscious goal pursuit, Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 12, No. 6)  (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée) 
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an additive pattern appeared.  This result was expected in the case of compatibility between 
primes and goal, and confirmed Bargh et al. (2001; Exp. 2) findings.  However, it was rather 
unexpected in the case of primes that were incompatible with the conscious goal (see MacRae & 
Johnston, 1998).  In our study, effects of nonconscious priming and conscious goal added to each 
other when primes and goal were compatible (leading to higher performances and longer times to 
perform the task) and subtracted each other when they were incompatible (leading to lower 
performances).  Results also strengthened the idea that compatibility is a key factor in the 
understanding of the interplay between nonconscious priming and conscious goal pursuit.   
 
In terms of processes, we suggest that on the one hand priming influences the allocation of 
available motivational resources, promoting a focus of the resources on a single goal in the case 
of compatibility between priming and conscious goal and on the other hand priming leads to a 
sharing of resources in the case of incompatibility between primes and goal.  Another plausible 
explanation is that goal-related primes do not influence the distribution of motivational resources 
but rather the sharing of attentional resources.  So, when priming and conscious goal are 
compatible, priming would promote an attentional focus, whereas incompatibility between 
primes and goal would lead to divided attention.  This is also compatible with the idea of an 
automatic attempt to inhibit the goal-incompatible content in memory.  These explanations, as 
well as our results, are globally in line with recent work from Shah and Kruglanski (2002), and 
extend their research to compatible/incompatible priming and conscious goals belonging to a 
same continuum, as well as to a new kind of task: a difficult motor task.  In Shah and Kruglanski 
(2002) nonconscious priming and conscious goals corresponded to different and unrelated tasks 
(solving anagrams and finding as many uses as possible for a box).  On the contrary, 
nonconscious primes and conscious goals we used were clearly linked – as they corresponded to 
different degrees on the accuracy continuum – and were related to the same task.  In this case, 
performance in a goal directed task tended to be improved by primes compatible with the 
conscious instructions and deteriorated by primes opposed to assigned explicit instructions.  This 
implies that resources attributable to a goal could be nonconsciously increased or decreased as a 
function of the compatibility of priming and conscious goals.  Thus, priming could be an 
interesting way to nonconsciously improve the motivational and/or attentional focus on a task 
thus improving performance.  Moreover a big advantage of priming is that it relies on 
unconscious and automatic processes that are quick and have a low cognitive cost (Meier, 
Morger & Graf, 2003). On the contrary, self-regulation of conscious goals relies on limited 
resources and its costs are well-known and far higher (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). 
 
Implications 
 
Results have implications in terms of self-regulation of behaviors.  They indicate that the pursuit 
of a conscious goal can be influenced by external factors that nonconsciously regulate behaviors 
outside of people’s awareness.  Our data indicate that the direction of this influence rely on the 
compatibility between nonconscious priming and conscious goals.  In our study, consciously 
goal-directed execution of a complex motor behavior was partly regulated by processes triggered 
by a nonconscious priming manipulation.  The task used in this research is minimally social.  
Nevertheless results can easily be extended to more social situations and tasks.  Thus, using a 
priming procedure in addition of goal setting could be a way to modify performance in a broad 
range of tasks, but also modify the way of acting in social situations (e.g., by using primes Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 12, No. 6)  (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée) 
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related to cooperation or affiliation). In an applied perspective, one could imagine, in addition of 
an accuracy instruction, to apply an accuracy priming procedure to witnesses before they begin 
to testimony.  In sports, priming of cooperation-related words or of competition-related words 
before a competition could constitute a means to improve team cooperation or, on the contrary, 
increase competition mindset.  Obviously, applications in terms of marketing, advertising and 
consumer behavior are also numerous.  In sum, regulation of behavior by nonconscious priming 
opens a wide range of perspectives. 
 
Limits 
 
A potential limit of our study is the lack of a fully integrated control group.  Nevertheless, such a 
group was not necessary given our main objective, which was to test the interplay of compatible 
and incompatible nonconscious priming and conscious goals.  Trends concerning the direction of 
the effects are provided by comparisons between the results and the standard level of 
performance obtained in the pre-experiment. They indicated that an incompatible nonconscious 
priming tends to hinder performance whereas a compatible nonconscious priming tends to 
improve performance.   
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Results support the idea that compatibility between primed contents and conscious goals 
constitutes an important factor regarding the interplay of priming and conscious goal pursuit. 
They also raise new research questions. Do priming directly regulate performance? Are these 
effects mediated or moderated by factors related to conscious goals characteristics, task 
perception or intra-individual factors?  It may be fruitful to examine the mediator/moderator 
impact of variables that are representative of conscious goal pursuit such as perceived difficulty, 
commitment, challenge level,  self-efficacy (Bandura & Locke, 2003), or affect (Aarts, Custers, 
& Holland, 2007) on the interplay between nonconscious priming and conscious goals.  Focusing 
on motivational measures will also be important to determine whether or not the effects can be 
attributed to the sharing of motivational rather than attentional resources. 
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APPENDIX 1: CORRELATION MATRIX (PEARSON CORRELATIONS) 
 
  Mean  SD  1  2 
1  14.60  11.45  1.00  -0.42* 
2  61.27  25.61  -0.42*  1.00 
* significant at p < .05 level.  
1 = Number of contacts 
2 = Time to perform the task (in s) 
 
APPENDIX 2: FUNNELED QUESTIONAIRE 
 
What do you think this experiment was trying to study? 
 
For each of the following questions, subject responds with "Yes" or "No."  If "Yes" response is 
given, then the subject is probed to explain. 
 
Do you think that any of the tasks you performed during the experimental session were related in 
any way? 
 
If you answered "YES", please explain in what way you think they were linked. 
 
Do you think that anything you did on one task has affected what you did on any other task?  
 
If you answered "YES", please explain how exactly it affected you.  
 
When you filled in the language test, did you notice anything strange or unusual about the words?  
 
If you answered "YES", please explain what was unusual.  
 
Did you notice a particular pattern or theme to the words that were included in the language test? 
 
If you answered "YES", please explain what it was.  
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